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THE IRRELEVANCE OF SINCERITY: DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 
JOHN M. KANG* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that insincerity occupies an ethically ambivalent if unsavory 
place in our culture.  Even as it pervasively animates our micro social 
encounters, and even as we concede its utility and more than occasional 
necessity, insincerity has never stood on the same podium of virtue as, for 
instance, honesty, loyalty and love.  One may say more strongly that 
insincerity is no virtue at all.  Usually it occupies an ethically tainted corner as 
implied by its very definition as an act whose success depends on its 
concealment.  Whereas a virtue like honesty carries presumptive public 
esteem, insincerity is greeted with suspicion and, when discovered, charged to 
justify its presence.  Part of that suspicion derives not simply from insincerity’s 
tactics of concealment but what those tactics might be concealing.  Whereas 
we tend to believe that impartial justifications may be declared publicly with 
the ostensible aim of benefiting others besides one’s self, insincere 
justifications imply the concealment of a motive that is so unspeakably self-
regarding or even plain selfish in nature that it cannot expect to garner support 
from others through an open public airing.  That is why more palatable, more 
insincere, justifications must be found.  Perhaps because of these familiar 
cultural assumptions regarding insincerity, the contempt to which it is 
subjected tends to be especially conspicuous in the culturally revered realm of 
democracy. 
 
* Doctoral candidate, Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  B.A., U.C. 
Berkeley; J.D., U.C.L.A.; M.A, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  I’m grateful for the 
criticisms of Mark Brandon, Arlene Saxonhouse and Kim Smith.  I’ve learned much about the 
issues discussed here from conversations with Don Herzog. 
  Section II (“Insincerity Defined”) of this Article is reprinted from John M. Kang, The 
Case for Insincerity, in 29 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 143-64 (Austin Sarat & 
Patricia Ewick eds., 2003).  This Article is part of a larger project on insincerity and the interested 
reader may consult the aforementioned essay along with John M. Kang, The Uses of Insincerity: 
Thomas Hobbes’ Theory of Law and Society, 15 L. & LIT. (forthcoming Dec. 2003).  The author 
can be reached for comments and questions at johnkang@umich.edu. 
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Insincerity is regarded as a roguish intruder in democratic discourse where 
people are expected to speak their minds freely, yet with a measure of sincere 
concern for their fellow citizens.  This general cultural response has found 
formal articulation in the scholarly movement, which, in recent years, has been 
assembled under the heading of “deliberative democracy.”  Its advocates—
who include a diverse mix of some of the most prominent law professors, 
philosophers, and political theorists—argue that people should frame their 
justifications in terms of the common good or the public generally, and that 
such justifications, at least sometimes, should be sincere.  Law professors like 
Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein try to justify sincerity in public discourse 
as part of a civic republican tradition,1 the Kantian philosopher John Rawls 
justifies sincerity in terms of inviolable principles derived from an imagined 
“original position,”2 the Frankfurt social theorist Jürgen Habermas makes 
sincerity an essential part of the aspect of legitimacy in his theory of discourse 
ethics,3 and political theorists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson turn to 
 
 1. Michelman seems to imply this requirement of sincerity by suggesting that public-
regarding dialogue (as opposed to selfish assertions) can lead to personal or political 
“transformation” by hearing the sincere arguments of others.  Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 
97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1513-14, 1531 (1988).  He also objects explicitly to “deception” stemming 
from self-interest in public arguments.  Id. at 1507.  Cass Sunstein similarly argues that an 
“emphasis on deliberation in republican thought is closely allied with the republican beliefs that 
the motivating force of political behavior should not be self-interest, narrowly defined, and that 
civic virtue should play a role in political life.” Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550 (1988) (emphasis added).  Sunstein continues to state that: 
[T]here is no mystery to this claim; it refers simply to the understanding that in their 
capacity as political actors, citizens and representatives are not supposed to ask only what 
is in their private interest, but also what will best serve the community in general—
understood as a response to the best general theory of social welfare. 
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 2. Rawls’ argument is one of the most formally sophisticated arguments for sincerity, and it 
is also one that is hard to encapsulate briefly.  Rather than offering an adequate—but also 
digressively long— summary that would continue for several pages in the footnote, the reader is 
urged to consult John M. Kang, The Case for Insincerity, in 29 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND 
SOCIETY 143-64 (Austin Sarat & Patricia Ewick eds., 2003). 
 3. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 1 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 21, 41, 99-100 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) 
(1981).  It is true that Habermas’s earlier work appears to nod approvingly at the historical efforts 
by the bourgeoisie to ignore status and focus on the arguments, and thus, he seems to hint that he 
is indifferent to sincerity in public discourse.  For example, see the belated English translation, 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 36-43 (Thomas 
Burger trans., 2000).  But in his later, more explicitly theoretical works, Habermas seems to 
believe that more information, including information about one’s motives, can be potentially 
useful to the ideal speech situation.  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 
72 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981); see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
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conventional ideas of fairness and reciprocity, and against insincerity, in their 
proposal for the norms that should govern political arguments.4 
Against such insistence on sincerity, this article argues that sincerity is 
both logically and practically irrelevant in contributing to a meaningful realm 
of free speech that can help generate diverse options for an audience to 
consider in its search for provisional political “truths.”  This is not to say that 
this author necessarily encourage insincerity in public discourse.  Rather, this 
article seeks to challenge the cultural and philosophical criticisms that have 
stigmatized insincerity in the arena of public discourse. 
The argument is organized as follows.  Part II provides a brief operational 
definition of insincerity.  Part III turns to the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, and while the focus centers on this most American of 
documents, the arguments are sufficiently general to speak to the concerns of 
those living in other countries who are interested in deliberative democracy.  
Part III discusses the three models of First Amendment jurisprudence in the 
area of free speech.  This section argues that free speech can be understood 
from three conceptually distinct approaches in libertarianism, 
communitarianism, and democracy.  Part IV argues that the logic of both 
libertarianism and communitarianism, two otherwise competing approaches, 
depends on the sincerity of the speaker, whereas the democratic approach does 
not.  Specifically, this section focuses on an aspect of the democratic approach 
called “critical interaction,” where listeners and readers are subjected to speech 
 
JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 89 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 
MIT Press 1993) (1991). 
 4. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson favor a practice of justification that involves 
“reciprocity,” where “motive” is premised on a “desire to justify to others,” not “self-interest.”  
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 53 (1996).  Even 
“enlightened self-interest” “cannot be the principle that ultimately governs disagreement in a 
democracy” because “it provides no principled limitation on taking advantage of other citizens, 
and no principled basis for giving others an advantage at no gain to oneself.”  Id. at 57-58.  
Furthermore, they argue that: 
An official who conceals information with the intention of causing citizens to believe 
something the official knows is false creates a deceptive secret.  The rare occasions on 
which such secrets are justified usually involve practices directed against criminals or 
enemies in wartime.  But that the immediate target of the deception is someone who does 
not have a right to the information is not a sufficient justification because other citizens 
too will be deceived. 
Id. at 117.  In addition to Gutmann and Thompson, Rawls, Habermas, Michelman and Sunstein, 
there are other advocates of deliberative democracy who offer broadly complementary arguments 
regarding sincerity.  See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE 
GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17-34 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 
1989); Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 105-07, 110-13 (Seyla Benhabib 
ed., 1996); JOHN DUNN, WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY IN THE FACE OF THE FUTURE ch. 1 
(1979). 
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that is critical, sometimes fiercely so, of their preexisting beliefs and 
assumptions.  What is relevant here is that the audience, understood 
collectively as a formally self-sovereign people, is given a meaningful 
diversity of ideas.  A focus on the sincerity of the speaker is not simply 
irrelevant, but potentially counterproductive. 
II.  INSINCERITY DEFINED 
As evinced in their sometimes bland homilies against its practice, those 
who criticize insincerity in public discourse tend to reflect a familiar social 
contempt for insincerity as an unsavory attempt to hoodwink an innocent 
audience.  Kent Greenawalt labels such insincerity as “deceitful”5 and 
“dishonest.”6  Robert Audi derides it as “manipulative”7 and its propensity “a 
moral defect.”8  John Rawls rebukes it as “hypocritical.”9  But a study of the 
nature and effects of insincerity requires a more nuanced appraisal of its 
complexity.  We know that insincerity, at a minimum, means delivering 
reasons that one believes personally unpersuasive or irrelevant.  As evaluation, 
it can mean offering opinions that do not reflect one’s true feelings.10  Within 
these broad definitional parameters, insincerity can don assorted guises and 
perform different functions depending on the context.  Yet this article will 
argue that insincerity should be distinguished from lying.  While insincerity 
intends to mislead the audience into making wrong inferences about the 
speaker’s true disposition about his reasons, lying involves deliberately 
misrepresenting the factual content of the reasons themselves.  While it is hard 
to argue that lying, thus conceived, is categorically worse than insincerity in 
terms of ethics or politics, there is a legitimate argument that lying 
fundamentally threatens the stability of promises and agreements in ways that 
insincerity does not.11  American courts seem to hold something of that opinion 
 
 5. KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 163 (1995). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 110 (2000). 
 8. Id. at 128. 
 9. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 215 (1996). 
 10. This definition is consistent with Lionel Trilling’s observation that the modern 
understanding of sincerity “refers primarily to a congruence between avowal and actual feeling.”  
LIONEL TRILLING, SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY 2 (1972).  This article’s definition is also 
complementary to Timur Kuran’s definition of insincerity as “preference falsification” as opposed 
to the falsification inherent in a factual representation.  See TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, 
PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 4 (1995). 
 11. For example, while Kant does not condone either insincerity or lying, as I have defined 
them, his case against the latter partly rests on a concern that “truthfulness is a duty that must be 
regarded as the basis of all duties founded on contract, and the laws of such duties would be 
rendered uncertain and useless if even the slightest exception to them were admitted.”  
IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, in 
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because there are obvious causes of action—fraud and libel, for example—for 
damages resulting from lying as I have defined it.  But it is much harder to 
identify a cause of action that corresponds to the damages that are said to result 
from insincerity as this article defines it.12  Indeed, the law specifically protects 
against misrepresentation by advertisers who indulge in insincerity through 
exaggeration or what lawyers call “puffing.”13  The chief rationale for this 
distinction is that the average consumer knows that the puffing probably is not 
true and thus does not rely on it, and even if some do actually rely on the 
statements, it is unfair to hold advertisers accountable for claims that are 
theoretically unverifiable.14  Stated otherwise, the distinction seems to be that 
facts adhere to the empirically testable essence of the merchandise, but puffing 
or opinion derive from an individual’s particular, and thus potentially 
subjective, experience with it.  This distinction in turn seems to suggest that 
insincerity, more so than lying, involves ideas of pleasure and preference along 
with those of disgust and dislike that collectively imply a potentially unique set 
of normative commitments and assumptions on the part of the individual. 
Having offered an operational definition of insincerity, I can move to the 
ways in which it relates to the different models of free speech under the First 
Amendment. 
III.  THREE MODELS OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
There are three principal philosophical approaches to understanding the 
First Amendment’s right to free speech.  These approaches can be called the 
justifications from libertarianism, communitarianism, and democracy.15  Other 
 
GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63, 65 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785). 
 12. It is true that libel, as a cause of action, need not require intent.  Therefore, negligence 
and recklessness may suffice in some cases.  See e.g., Savage v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 21 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 13. “Puffing” is usually defined as “an exaggeration or overstatement expressed in broad, 
vague, and commendatory language.”  Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 945 (3d Cir. 
1993).  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(b) (2000) permits companies to sue each other for false 
advertising that misrepresents and thus hurts competitors.  Id.  Under the Act, a company enjoys a 
complete defense if it can show that the part of the advertisement in question contains no factual 
assertion, but is, for example, an opinion or puffing.  See Jean Wegman Burns, Confused 
Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 867-68 (1999). 
 14. Burns, supra note 13, at 868-69. 
 15. In a textually attentive study, David Brink offers a potential fourth approach from 
“Millian deliberation” whereby deliberation is channeled to promote personal development.  See 
David O. Brink, Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate Speech, 7 LEGAL THEORY 
119 (2001).  It seems however, that aspects of his approach may be subsumed by others.  Brink’s 
approach seems to borrow its ethos from a version of libertarianism that stresses self-
actualization, and it seems to borrow its structure and operation from a version of the democratic 
approach, which stresses deliberation.  See id. 
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names have been used to describe them,16 but the differences in names are not 
essential, only the differences in ideas.  Before beginning their explication, 
there is the matter of definitional qualification.  These approaches can embody 
diverse and competing conceptions, and it is necessary to be careful not to 
insist dogmatically on oversimplifications.  Furthermore, it is not this article’s 
aim to explore every variant of each approach or to argue the merits of any one 
variant; rather this article’s aim is more general in trying to identify each 
approach’s broad characteristics and only insofar as necessary to illuminate its 
thesis about sincerity and insincerity.  Having offered these qualifications, a 
description of the three approaches follow. 
A. The Libertarian Approach 
According to the libertarian approach, the relevant community has no 
moral right to prohibit a speaker from speech because it is offensive to the 
community’s substantive moral commitments or its informal codes of 
civility.17  There are two basic assumptions that underwrite this position.  
Although one need not logically imply the other, they tend to be articulated 
together.  First, even as he insists that the community is collectively bound to 
permit his freedom of expression, the libertarian is skeptical about the 
existence of any overarching substantive morals that can justifiably bind the 
community’s members.  This premise tends to rely on Kantian assertions about 
the priority of the right over the good,18 although it can also be reflected more 
colloquially by judges who observe that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s 
lyric.”19  Second, the libertarian holds that freedom of speech is valuable in 
enabling individuals to seek self-actualization or to affirm or reaffirm their 
identities.  Philosophically, this view again tends to draw from a Kantian 
vocabulary of “self-respect arising from autonomous self-determination 
without which the life of the spirit is meager and slavish.”20  In addition, the 
libertarian approach “makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos that so 
dominates our popular and political culture.”21  Whatever its precise source of 
justification, the libertarian view is likely to criticize as unjustifiable the 
 
 16. Robert Post, for example, refers to the democratic approach as the “collectivist” 
approach.  ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 268-69 (1995).  David Richards describes the libertarian approach in terms of 
Lockean and Kantian arguments for respecting individual conscience.  DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, 
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION chs. 3-5 (1986). 
 17. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 484, 496 (1990). 
 18. See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 16, at ch. 4. 
 19. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
 20. David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the 
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974); see RICHARDS, supra note 16, at ch. 4. 
 21. OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996). 
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restrictions on violent pornography, racist speech, and other forms of 
communication that are regarded as offensive by general community 
convention, for such forms of speech are, to the libertarian, examples of 
potential self-actualization by the speaker.22 
B. The Communitarian Approach 
The communitarian approach stands at the opposite pole from the 
libertarian approach.  It prioritizes the community’s moral commitments and 
norms of civility over the individual rights of the speaker.23  To employ a 
previously used term, the communitarian approach privileges the community’s 
collective attempts at self-actualization over those of any particular 
individual.24  Accordingly, legislation that proscribes the right to expression is 
not regarded as stemming simply from administrative concerns over time, 
place, and manner, but from a morally informed endeavor to define the 
community.  The rationale for the communitarian approach is varied.  It may 
rest on the following premises.25  First, it may rest on the belief that by 
affirming the community’s values against assault by individual speakers, the 
state can strengthen its claim of political legitimacy, and hence, the consent of 
the people is more likely to be genuine.26  Second, the rationale may derive 
from the idea that preserving shared social beliefs rooted in tradition and 
culture, as opposed to abandoning the community’s members to a series of 
superficial options delivered by irresponsible speakers, is necessary to help 
people fashion for themselves meaningful individual lives.27  Third, the 
rationale may arise from the premise that an individual identity is not chosen 
per se by a person, but rather is ascribed by the community.  Thus to permit the 
erosion of community values would be to permit the partial erosion of a 
person’s sense of self.28 
To these varied rationales for the communitarian approach, there is a 
difference of opinion among communitarians regarding whether people 
 
 22. For example, David A. J. Richards relies on a modified Kantian premise to justify nearly 
unlimited rights to pornography.  See Richards, supra note 20; see also RICHARDS, supra note 16, 
at 204-09. 
 23. See Martin G. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic 
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REV. 267, 
270 (1991). 
 24. Id. 
 25. This is not meant to suggest that other premises are unavailable. 
 26. Charles Taylor, Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late 
Twentieth Century Canada, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIETY IN CANADA 183, 
213, 215 (Alan Cairns & Cynthia Williams research coordinators, 1985); WILL KYMLICKA, 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 224 (1990). 
 27. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 204-05 (1981); 
CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 157 (1979). 
 28. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 (1982). 
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actually share the values that define the community, or whether they should.  
Sometimes, the argument for shared values presents itself as an attempt to 
codify an empirical fact regarding what the community holds dear.  For 
example, Michael Sandel advocates the regulation of pornography by a local 
community “on the grounds that pornography offends its way of life.”29  Other 
times, the argument for shared values is more of an aspiration.  While not 
typically considered a communitarian, Catharine MacKinnon provides an 
illustration.  MacKinnon also wants to regulate pornography, but, unlike 
Sandel, she does not see pornography as threatening the community’s values, 
which, for her, are the values constructed from a male-dominated perspective.  
Rather, for MacKinnon, pornography, even violent pornography, reproduces in 
exaggerated form what the community already regards as “normal” beliefs 
about gender and sex.30  Hence, MacKinnon argues that the purpose of 
pornography regulation is not to reflect present community values, but to 
aspire to something better as an ethical matter by endorsing a vision of 
community values that rests on treating women as deserving of equal respect.31 
C. The Democratic Approach 
Unlike the communitarian or libertarian approaches, the democratic 
approach uses the First Amendment to serve the ends of democracy by 
regulating public discourse in such a manner so as to maximize access to 
information, so that people might better exercise their rights of self-
sovereignty.32  The democratic approach attempts to ensure that people are 
exposed to a rich array of information and competing views, so that whatever 
they decide as a matter of political course is theoretically borne of meaningful 
deliberation.33  There are accordingly two rights that function symbiotically in 
this political enterprise: 
 
 29. Michael J. Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal, NEW REPUBLIC, May 7, 1984, at 15, 
17. 
 30. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW ch. 3 (1987).  See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) [hereinafter 
ONLY WORDS]. 
 31. ONLY WORDS, supra note 30, at ch. 3. 
 32. Owen Fiss argues for the democratic approach and against the libertarian and 
communitarian approaches.  One of the ways that he attempts to critique the latter two is by 
persuasively showing that their respective proponents simply assert, rather than argue, the 
primacy of their respective approaches.  FISS, supra note 21, at 3, 12-13.  Yet if that is true, the 
fault inheres in the proponents of the two approaches, not necessarily the merits of the approaches 
themselves, which await a fuller defense by others. 
 33. For a classic articulation of the democratic view, see, for example, ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).  For more recent 
treatments, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION ch. 7 (1993) (discussing political deliberation, especially on pages 202-
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[T]hat of every citizen to participate in self-government by trying to win 
support for his or her politically relevant ideas; and that of potential listeners to 
hear and be informed so that they may decide how best—in their judgments—
to allocate political resources.34 
These two rights may collectively evoke Justice Holmes’s familiar metaphor of 
a “marketplace of ideas” in public discourse whereby arguments compete with 
each other to vie for the audience’s support.35  While not entirely the same as 
the democratic approach, the marketplace metaphor is nonetheless 
complementary.  Less complementary are the aims of both the communitarian 
and libertarian approaches.  The democratic approach explicitly permits 
offensive criticism of what the communitarian regards as off-limits in certain 
ethical commitments and civil norms and it rejects the libertarian premise that 
the primary benefit of public discourse is to reduce concerns of individual 
psychological fulfillment logically irrespective of community norms.36 
Structurally, the democratic approach envisions what Robert Post calls 
“critical interaction,” a “freedom from the boundaries of community 
expectations and norms” that “initiates the very possibility of public discourse 
 
03 and 253-54).  See FISS, supra note 21 (providing a largely lucid account of political 
deliberation).  The democratic approach can be applied to other aspects of the Constitution, 
including the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  See generally JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 34. WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 623 (2d 
ed. 1995). 
 35. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  A full 
presentation of the “marketplace of ideas” rationale was offered earlier by John Stuart Mill.  Mill 
explains that: 
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the 
human race: posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the 
opinion still more than those who hold it.  If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a 
benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision 
with error. 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 23 (1921). 
 36. There has been widespread debate over which of these views should principally animate 
the First Amendment’s regulation of public discourse.  Given its organizational parameters, this 
Article cannot fully introduce, let alone settle, that debate.  It can, however, attempt a clarification 
in this regard.  Arguably, most would want the First Amendment to understand public discourse 
in terms of all three approaches, for most aspire to realize psychological fulfillment, and at other 
times, to enjoy the belonging and stability engendered by community norms, and, at other times, 
to seek to exercise our powers of democratic self-sovereignty.  All three approaches represent 
liberal virtues, and in their abstract conditions, they can coexist without conceptual conflict.  
Furthermore, all three approaches tend to rely to some extent on conceptions about autonomy, 
choice, and equality, all familiar liberal ideas.  Much of the disagreement would seem to be 
regarding the proper balance of the virtues within each approach.  The debate arises when the 
aims attendant to libertarianism, communitarianism, and democracy conflict with each other, as in 
the legal regulation of pornography and racist speech. 
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by distinguishing it as pure communication able to reach out beyond the 
confines of any single community.”37  Outside such community confines, 
speech in critical interaction may be remarkably abusive and unabashedly 
vulgar in tone and substance.38  Critical interaction is the domain of public 
discourse in which misogynistic pornography, for example, may assault the 
community’s norms under cover of First Amendment protection.39 
What this article seeks to do is explore the ways in which insincerity, and 
not its opposite, promotes the aims of critical interaction.  This article explains 
that against the claims of some prominent philosophers and legal theorists, the 
public discourse that is so vital to democracy need not depend, logically or 
practically, on sincerity. 
IV.  CRITICAL INTERACTION IS PROMOTED BY INSINCERITY 
Some contemporary philosophers and legal theorists tend to insist that 
speakers present justifications that meet certain standards.40  Paramount among 
them are the requirements that justifications under some circumstances should 
be impartial insofar as opponents are likely to find them reasonable41 and that 
the tone of debate should be one of earnest civility.42  Much of the animating 
 
 37. POST, supra note 16, at 146. 
 38. See id. at 147-48. 
 39. See Lili Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Identity, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
49, 59 (1992).  Owen Fiss argues that the democratic approach broadly forbids First Amendment 
protection for misogynistic pornography and racist speech because they stigmatize the voices of 
its victims and thus undermine their credibility and thus their ability to participate equally in 
democratic politics.  See FISS, supra note 21, at 13.  Worth examining is Robert Post’s critique of 
Fiss’s understanding of the democratic approach as insufficiently attentive to the aims of self-
sovereignty.  See POST, supra note 16, at 268-89.  This article’s intent is not to open debate about 
which version of the democratic approach is more justifiable, but rather to sketch its aims and 
structural properties by presenting the most straightforward version. 
 40. See Paul G. Chevigny, The Dialogic Right of Free Expression: A Reply to Michael 
Martin, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 920, 921-22 (1982). 
 41. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 9, at 224 (stating that justifications resting on public reason 
should “appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in 
common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial”); 
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 4, Ch. 2. 
 42. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 217, 219, 224, 226, 251 n.41.  Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson go further than mere civility by calling upon a stronger commitment in “civic 
magnanimity.”  GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 82-85.  Coming from two self-styled 
liberals, their discussion of civic magnanimity has a rather surprisingly Aristotelian flavor in its 
emphasis on an “excellence of character.” Id. at 79.  They argue that “mutual respect demands 
more than toleration.  It requires a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the 
persons with whom one disagrees.  It consists in an excellence of character that permits a 
democracy to flourish. . . .  This is a distinctively deliberative kind of character.”  Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
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logic for both imperatives relies on a commitment to basic fairness43 or even 
some higher ethical assumption about how all people deserve to be treated with 
equal respect as autonomous and deliberative beings.44  The Supreme Court, as 
an institution, has unequivocally rejected the approach of such theorists and 
philosophers.  The Court reads the Constitution as permitting in public 
discourse vulgarly partisan justifications dressed in even more vulgarly uncivil 
garb.45  A chief reason why the Court interprets the First Amendment as 
barring regulation of both imperatives in public discourse is to ensure that the 
audience is exposed to a wide range of viewpoints and information.46  
Expressed negatively, the logic is that without such permissiveness, speakers 
are less likely, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, to criticize ideas and 
public figures.  This possibility may in turn hinder the ability of the listeners as 
a sovereign people to reflect meaningfully about their political options as 
presented in public discourse.  Whereas some philosophers and legal theorists 
propose theories that are underwritten by ethical premises of some sort, the 
Court’s version of public discourse is more explicitly political. 
A. Public Discourse and the Democratic Approach 
A famous instance of the democratic approach is found in New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan.47  In that case, the New York Times ran an advertisement 
saying that peaceful efforts at civil rights reform in Montgomery, Alabama, 
and elsewhere, were “being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those 
who would deny and negate [the Constitution].”48  The advertisement did not 
mention who specifically was responsible for such terror, but L. B. Sullivan, a 
city official responsible for the Montgomery police, argued that he was falsely 
depicted and sued the New York Times for libel.49  An Alabama jury awarded 
what was then an exorbitant sum for libel in the amount of $500,000.50  The 
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.51  The United States Supreme Court 
reversed the Alabama Supreme Court in one of its most important First 
Amendment decisions.52  Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, argued that a 
 
 43. Gutmann and Thompson seem to approach public discourse in this manner.  See 
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 82-85. 
 44. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 217-18, 226. 
 45. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1988) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects a parody of the Reverend Jerry Falwell having sex “with his mother in an 
outhouse”). 
 46. See Paul G. Stern, Note, A Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and its Relation 
to Public Discourse, 99 YALE L.J. 925, 937-38 (1990). 
 47. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 48. Id. at 256. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 292. 
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public official like Sullivan was subject to an “actual malice” standard 
whereby he could only recover damages for libel if he could show that the 
defendant made a false statement regarding the public official acting within his 
official capacity, and that the statement was made “with knowledge that it was 
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”53  Merely 
publicizing some shameful factual inaccuracy was thus insufficient to establish 
liability.  Even doing so “negligently”—below the standard of responsibility 
for a reasonable person—was not enough.54  The Court thus granted 
unprecedented First Amendment protection to speakers and thereby made 
public officials remarkably vulnerable in the realm of public discourse.  The 
rationale for the Court’s new rule was that “public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”55 
There are two points in Justice Brennan’s statements that deserve 
emphasis.  First, he delivers a paradox in that an aspect of public discourse in a 
civilized democracy must permit speech that is anything other than civilized or 
democratic, for that is the only way to examine public issues in a vigorous 
manner and to generate new possibilities pertaining to them.56  Second, 
following logically from the first point, Justice Brennan, under his formulation 
of actual malice, silently ignores as constitutionally relevant whether a speaker 
intentionally sought to libel and injure a public official because of hatred or 
revenge.57 
 
 53. Id. at 279-80. 
 54. See id.  The Court clarified this aspect in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).  
The Court stated: 
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have 
published, or would have investigated before publishing.  There must be sufficient 
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as 
to the truth of his publication.  Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for 
truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. 
Id. at 731. 
 55. Id. at 270. 
 56. It is hard to see how the New York Times advertisement is uncivilized or undemocratic.  
The theoretical possibilities created by Justice Brennan’s rule permit unpleasant forms of speech, 
something that becomes abundantly clear in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).  
There, Larry Flynt, the publisher of the notoriously pornographic Hustler Magazine, ran a parody 
of the Reverend Jerry Falwell having sex “with his mother in an outhouse.”  Id. at 47-48.  See 
infra note 57. 
 57. While perhaps it is less likely to receive more explicit notice than Brennan’s first point, 
his second point has received clear reaffirmation in later cases.  A per curiam opinion found that 
the trial judge misunderstood the actual malice standard when the “jury was instructed in part that 
it could find for the respondent if it were shown that petitioner had published the editorials ‘with 
bad or corrupt motive,’ or ‘from personal spite, ill will or a desire to injure plaintiff.’”  Beckley 
Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967).  In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n 
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It is no accident that the actual malice test embodies both the aspiration to 
democracy and the flat indifference to sincerity.  There are latent hints in 
Justice Brennan’s opinion in New York Times Co. regarding this relationship, 
 
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), the Court overturned the lower court’s decision because the judge, 
in instructing the jury about the elements for liability pertaining to libel, wrongly “defined 
‘malice’ to include ‘spite, hostility or deliberate intention to harm.’”  Id. at 10.  Similarly, in 
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), the Court stated that it 
“is worth emphasizing that the actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of 
ill will or ‘malice’ in the ordinary sense of the term.”  Id. at 666.  As illustration, the Harte-Hanks 
Court pointed to its earlier case of Hustler Magazine, where the ardently spiteful pornographer 
Larry Flynt depicted Jerry Falwell in an emotionally jarring parody as having sex “with his 
mother in an outhouse.”  Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 48.  See supra note 56.  Quoting Hustler 
Magazine, the Harte-Hanks Court again stated that a public figure “‘may not recover for the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . without showing . . . that the publication 
contains a false statement of fact which was made . . . with knowledge that the statement was 
false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.’”  Harte-Hanks Communications, 
491 U.S. at 667 (quoting Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56).  Furthermore, the Harte-Hanks 
Court also clarified that: 
[T]he fact that the defendant published the defamatory material in order to increase its 
profits [would not] suffice to prove actual malice.  The allegedly defamatory statements at 
issue in the New York Times case were themselves published as part of a paid 
advertisement.  If a profit motive could somehow strip communications of the otherwise 
available constitutional protection, our cases from New York Times to Hustler Magazine 
would be little more than empty vessels. 
Id. at 667 (citation omitted). 
  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) was yet another occasion in which the Court 
could reiterate its indifference towards motives in the promotion of truth.  Id. at 72-73.  The Court 
quoted with approval the following statement by a lower court: 
  If upon a lawful occasion for making a publication, he has published the truth, and 
no more, there is no sound principle which can make him liable, even if he was actuated 
by express malice . . . . 
  It has been said that it is lawful to publish truth from good motives, and for 
justifiable ends.  But this rule is too narrow.  If there is a lawful occasion—a legal right to 
make a publication—and the matter true, the end is justifiable, and that, in such case, must 
be sufficient. 
Id. at 73 (quoting State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 42-43 (1837)). 
  The textual evidence presented above clearly indicates that if a speaker delivers some 
extravagant charge later discovered to be untrue against a public official and that he later 
confesses to be motivated purely by a personal hatred for the official, he is nonetheless protected 
by the First Amendment as long as he shows that the statement was not made with actual malice.  
Yet the same speaker’s motivation would be legally relevant if he aimed his remarks against 
someone who was, for example, an anonymous private person, or certainly, if the person depicted 
in the speech were a private person involved in a strictly private matter.  In this way, the actual 
malice test specifically recognizes the hindrance to free speech regarding public issues posed by a 
concern regarding the speaker’s sincerity.  Indeed, while the actual malice test does allude to the 
speaker’s state of mind, the requirement that the plaintiff show that the speaker knew that the 
speech was false does not refer to sincere motivation, but rather to the speech act’s factual 
representations. 
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but the connection needs to be made explicit.  That move first necessitates the 
counterintuitive realization that even though we casually regard sincerity and 
truth as mutually sympathetic, there are ironic possibilities that they are 
mutually resistant, and so too that it is actually insincerity that might lead to 
the discovery of truth.  Consider the difference between what Don Herzog calls 
psychological objectivity and sociological objectivity.58  Both forms of 
objectivity represent a state of mind where one may reflect on what is the 
“truth.”59  Psychological objectivity requires that “each and every individual 
strive for a dispassionate and disinterested judgment.”60  Implicit in the 
requirement is that people be sincere in their judgments and arguments.  
Accordingly, “[h]irlings and other partisans are then obviously untrustworthy; 
we shouldn’t pay even perfunctory attention to their stridently one-sided 
views.”61  But sociological objectivity requires “a relatively detached audience 
capable of sorting out arguments pressed by partisans.”62  Under this view, 
“[i]nstead of disparaging their political enthusiasm, we can capitalize on it: 
they’re motivated to search out every error made by their opponents, to 
marshal all the resources of their own case as forcibly as they can.”63  Here, it 
is irrelevant whether the speakers are secretly obsessed with indulging their 
narrow interests or in sincerely furthering the noble cause of democracy—
whatever such innocence of motive could possibly mean.  What matters is that 
the audience is exposed to a diversity of views and ideas.64  Such diversity 
creates more choices for a theoretically self-sovereign people to make 
informed and sophisticated decisions about their political future. 
That is why insincerity is not necessarily objectionable from the 
perspective of a democratic approach.  In fact, insincerity is emblematic of a 
larger dynamic in politics where people constantly seek to further their own 
particular interests.  We already know that the justifications and arguments 
proffered by such groups are often not animated by pious motives to further 
public discourse, but rather by self-interested motivation to further their own 
causes.  Yet that hardly qualifies as a reason to admonish them, for they may 
invent outstanding justifications for their positions or deliver devastating 
critiques of their opponents that may enrich public discourse.  By removing 
sincerity as legally irrelevant to public discourse, the audience is able to hear a 
greater variety and potentially better quality of arguments.  In this way, the 
 
 58. DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 159 (1998).  For an early 
intimation of these categories, see Don Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 POL. 
THEORY 473 (1986). 
 59. HERZOG, supra note 58, at 159. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. HERZOG, supra note 58, at 159. 
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democratic approach reveals itself as inherently distinct from the libertarian 
and communitarian approaches in its relationship to insincere public discourse.  
Whereas the democratic approach removes sincerity as logically irrelevant 
from public discourse, the other two approaches are logically contingent upon 
sincerity, although in quite different ways. 
B. Public Discourse and the Libertarian Approach 
The libertarian approach conceives public discourse in terms of the 
speaker’s self-actualization.  The purpose of public discourse then is to enable 
people to express themselves in their presumably sincere condition.  We can 
find an instance of this view from one of Thoreau’s more than occasional 
gestures toward romanticism.  Thoreau stated: 
I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could 
name,—if ten honest men only,—ay, if one HONEST man, in this State of 
Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this co-
partnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefore, it would be the 
abolition of slavery in America.  For it matters not how small the beginning 
may seem to be: what is once well done is done forever.65 
The act of civil disobedience is performed not primarily to benefit the 
community.  One man’s lone decision to serve jail time would have hardly 
signaled something like the abolition of slavery in America.  Rather, the 
dramatic gesture is meant to cleanse one’s conscience.66  It is an act to 
demonstrate sincerely both to the community and to one’s self what one is 
really made of.  The speech act is thus not simply expressive but also self-
actualizing. 
Something similar might be said of the Court’s understanding of some of 
the cases that fall into the categories of the sacred and the profane.  For the 
latter, we can look to Cohen v. California.67  There, the Court reversed the 
prosecution of Robert Cohen, who violated a disturbance of the peace statute 
for wearing, in a Los Angeles courthouse, a jacket emblazoned with the words 
“Fuck the Draft.”68  The Court held that the First Amendment protected 
Cohen’s expression.69  Part of its justification stemmed from the view that “the 
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual,”70 
and because Cohen’s message contained “inexpressible emotions.”71  The 
 
 65. Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in AMERICAN SPIRITUALITIES: A READER 
309 (Catherine L. Albanese ed., 2001). 
 66. See the related discussion in HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 58-68 (1972). 
 67. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 68. Id. at 16-17. 
 69. Id. at 26. 
 70. Id. at 25. 
 71. Id. at 26. 
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focus on the aesthetic and emotive dimensions of the speaker—as opposed to 
the potential political meaning for the listeners—seems to suggest that the 
Court is primarily interested in making legal space for the speaker’s self-
actualization along such dimensions.  The silent, but crucial, assumption for 
protecting such self-actualization is that it is sincere. 
While factually quite different from the profanity of Cohen, the religious 
character of Thomas v. Review Board72 presented similar issues regarding self-
actualization.  Eddie Thomas was a foundry worker in Indiana who was 
transferred from making steel sheeting to making tank gun turrets.73  As a 
Jehovah’s Witness, he refused to participate in activities that would contribute 
to war.74  The foundry fired him, and Thomas sought unemployment benefits.75  
The Indiana Supreme Court refused to permit the dispensing of such benefits 
because “although the claimant’s reasons for quitting were described as 
religious, it was unclear what his belief was, and what the religious basis of his 
belief was.”76  The confusion or doubt is understandable.  How could 
producing steel sheeting that could be added to a tank’s armor differ from 
building its turret, leading to its ultimate construction, and hence its availability 
for combat?  The Indiana Supreme Court, moreover, could point to another 
Jehovah’s Witness who had no qualms about making turrets.77  Still, on appeal, 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, reversed the Indiana Supreme 
Court, stating that: 
Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an 
unreasonable one.  Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs 
because the believer admits that he is “struggling” with his position or because 
his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more 
sophisticated person might employ.78 
In this passage, Chief Justice Burger does not justify Thomas’s expression 
as constitutionally protected because it is likely to cause reflection or persuade 
anyone who witnesses it.  Burger thus avoids the democratic approach.  He 
also facially avoids the communitarian approach, because there is no 
suggestion that Thomas’s specific conduct reinforces some pervasive belief 
among Jehovah’s Witnesses as a group.  Rather, Burger justifies his decision 
by turning to a libertarian approach.  Burger seems to imply that no one—
including other Jehovah’s Witnesses—would necessarily even understand 
Thomas’s actions as coherent.  The action is constitutionally protected, it 
 
 72. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 73. Id. at 709. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 714 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 1979), rev’d 
450 U.S. 707 (1981)). 
 77. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. 
 78. Id. 
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seems, largely because it is the way that Thomas himself has come to terms 
with his religion.  That justification in turn must depend on the assumption that 
Thomas’s religious expression is sincere, and that it does not stem from a 
desire to avoid strenuous or dangerous activity or to avoid being under the 
control of an overbearing supervisor. 
C. A Communitarian View 
Sincerity is also essential to the logic of the communitarian approach to 
public discourse.  Instead of focusing on the self-actualization of the speaker, 
this view tends to focus on the self-actualization of the community.  There are 
easy examples in the modes of speech that both reflect and constitute 
communitarian enterprises like marriage and group-based religious 
observance.  When couples exchange marital vows, some of them surely marry 
for reasons that have nothing to do with love or devotion and have no intent on 
keeping promises of any kind in sickness or in health.  The logic of the marital 
union as we presently understand it, however, requires that they outwardly act 
as if they do and that the audience ceremoniously assumes that they do as well.  
Similarly, we know that many people attend Sunday church services for a host 
of reasons that have little to do with religious devotion.  They may see it as 
another social event, an opportunity to find a potential spouse, or simply an 
excuse to get a terrific lunch at no charge.  Again, like with the exchange of 
marital vows, the logic of prayer and communion during Sunday services 
formally presupposes that people are sincere in their devotion and that they are 
not there to indulge these other desires.  For a person to publicly disclose the 
true, but culturally unspeakable, motivations behind his participation in these 
communitarian practices would undermine the practices’ premises and aims. 
In addition to the rituals and ceremonies within civil society, there are 
common laws fashioned by judges that also reflect communitarian values 
whose legitimacy depends on the formal assumption that the values are 
sincerely felt by the community.79  There are numerous instances where judges 
turn to what they perceive as the community’s values as an interpretive guide 
for their reading of the Constitution.80  Justice Cardozo understood the rights 
attendant to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as “so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”81  
And Justice Frankfurter memorably declared that the same Due Process Clause 
 
 79. See, e.g., Inc. Vill. of Lynbrook v. United Artists Corp., 347 N.Y.S.2d 856, 859 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1973). 
 80. See Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing: 
Darrow’s Defense of Leopold and Leob, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1057 n.400 (1994). 
 81. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
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does not tolerate governmental conduct that “shocks the conscience” of those 
in the community.82 
Aside from these examples, perhaps a singularly memorable one is 
provided by Chief Justice Burger’s concurring opinion in Bowers v. 
Hardwick.83  In Bowers, Michael Hardwick, a gay man, was arrested for 
violating Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute, a statute that Georgia refused to apply 
to heterosexuals.84  Upholding the Georgia statute, Chief Justice Burger thickly 
invoked the grammar of communitarianism by expressing a cultural contempt 
for homosexual sodomy: 
[T]he proscriptions against sodomy have very “ancient roots.”  Decisions of 
individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state 
intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.  Condemnation of 
those practices is firmly rooted in Judalo-Christian [sic] moral and ethical 
standards. . . .  Blackstone described “the infamous crime against nature” as an 
offense of “deeper malignity” than rape, a heinous act “the very mention of 
which is a disgrace to human nature,” and “a crime not fit to be named.” . . .  
To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a 
fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.85 
Chief Justice Burger’s grandiose invocations would lose their cultural authority 
if they were revealed as empirically unfounded because the residents of 
Georgia never sincerely felt any animosity against homosexual sodomy.  The 
same may be said of the references to “the traditions and conscience of our 
people”86 and to “those canons of decency and fairness . . . of English-speaking 
peoples”87 by Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter.  It might be true that such 
pronouncements about the community’s beliefs, as one famous English judge 
insists, “does not depend on the counting of heads” to determine their 
legitimacy.88  But if the method of verification is an open question, what is not 
a matter of uncertainty is the premise that to be logically coherent, let alone 
persuasive, such invocations to community values need to presume that the 
community accepts them sincerely. 
 
 82. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).  Justice Frankfurter also stated: 
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause “inescapably imposes upon this 
Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings (resulting in a 
conviction) in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness 
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those 
charged with the most heinous offenses.” 
Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)). 
 83. 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 84. Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 196-97 (emphasis in original). 
 86. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105. 
 87. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169. 
 88. Lord Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 66, 78 
(R.M. Dworkin ed., 1977). 
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D. Democratic Approach Revisited 
But both the logic and the aim of the democratic approach to free speech 
formally reject sincerity as irrelevant.  We can explore this position more 
precisely by examining how the demands of insincerity are theoretically 
distributed upon both speaker and audience.  Whereas psychological 
objectivity is preoccupied with the public affirmation of what the speaker and 
audience each consider as true, what we have called sociological objectivity 
requires a willingness by speaker and audience to suspend at least outwardly 
what they normally take to be true.  Sociological objectivity thus implies an 
assumption of fallibilism, that nothing is a priori invulnerable to change or 
criticism.89  We can see an example in John Stuart Mill’s explication of the 
devil’s advocate.  Mill speaks of how the Roman Catholic Church listens 
patiently to a priest whose job is to serve as a “devil’s advocate” charged with 
uncovering scandalous secrets on all candidates for sainthood and forcefully 
arguing against their canonization.90  This example, while practiced by “[t]he 
most intolerant of churches,”91 is to serve for Mill as a general paradigm for 
public discourse.92  And although Mill is unhappily silent on the uses of 
insincerity, his example highlights the ways in which insincerity is required of 
both speaker and audience.  First, the devil’s advocate would have to be 
willing, with seemingly stout confidence, to launch arguments and forge ahead 
with lines of inquiry that he may personally loathe as shameful and repulsive.  
Second, those priests in the audience who feel intense fondness towards the 
candidate—those who may have personally initiated the canonization as partial 
gratitude for the candidate’s life-altering inspiration—would have to repress 
the potentially simmering rage they feel toward an especially mischievous 
devil’s advocate who gleefully digs into obscure rumors concerning the 
candidate’s alcoholism, gambling, and other habits.  In the pursuit of truth, 
then, both the speaker and the audience might have to behave in a potentially 
insincere manner by repressing that which they sincerely cherish and, instead, 
outwardly portray behavior that they sincerely detest. 
One can sharpen that image by juxtaposing it to a hypothetical where both 
speaker and audience are decidedly sincere.  We need not look for such a 
hypothetical in the boisterous rabble of a crowded market square in Mill’s 
nineteenth century London, but to the seemingly austere confines of the 
present Supreme Court.  If we expect anyone to overcome narrow prejudices, 
and instead to pursue relentlessly the broader aims of sociological objectivity, 
 
 89. A famous version of fallibilism can be found in J. S. Mill’s statement that the “beliefs 
which we have most warrant for have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the 
whole world to prove them unfounded.”  MILL, supra note 35, at 29. 
 90. Id. at 28. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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we might look, among other places, to the Court’s justices.  John Rawls 
certainly does.  He places a qualified confidence in “a supreme court” as a 
model of what he calls “public reason” and principled deliberation.93  There 
would seem to be cultural support for Rawls’s confidence.  The Supreme Court 
would seem to stand as a cultural exemplum of everything conducive to critical 
interaction—a collection of highly learned, highly intellectual, and apparently 
dispassionate individuals who publicly present themselves not as 
representatives for special interests, nor even as representatives for the people 
as a whole, but as fellow travelers in the search for truth, as perhaps the closest 
modern equivalent to philosopher kings and queens.94  The very structure of 
the Court’s deliberative process would seem to lend credence to this cultural 
picture.  The justices regularly convene at conference meetings to discuss and 
argue the cases before the Court.  The strictly confidential nature of the 
meetings affords the justices ample opportunity to assume the sort of devil’s 
advocate extolled by Mill to speculate and to experiment in a way unavailable 
in the public glare of reporters and visitors who would mark the justices’ every 
word and demeanor.  At the conference, the justices are confronted with 
having to persuade their opponents and to defend their positions, and there may 
even be opportunity for the justices to learn something from those who 
diametrically oppose their views.  These Court meetings would seem to 
represent, then, the sort of vibrant and potentially extraordinary deliberation 
idealized by some advocates of deliberative democracy. 
But what if the justices behaved far more sincerely?  Or, to employ the 
terms that I have used thus far, what would occur if the justices engaged in 
those practices of discourse associated with the pursuit, or better, reaffirmation 
of some version of psychological objectivity?  Justices who share similar 
ideological commitments would engage only each other.  Thus conservative 
justices like Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas would send each other 
internal memorandums, and liberal Justices like John Stevens and Ruth 
Ginsberg would do the same.  The end result would be a practice that is 
inconsistent with the critical interaction of the democratic approach.  It would 
instead be a practice whose ethos resembles that which animates the libertarian 
and communitarian approaches.  The justices would seem to view discourse as 
a means of expressing and reaffirming some aspect of their preformed, 
unreconstructed individual identity, whether that be as a liberal or a 
 
 93. RAWLS, supra note 9, at 233.  For similar views of Supreme Court justices, see 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT ch. 2 (2001).  Also see the 
broadly congenial treatments in Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 10-11 (1979) and Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
 94. The image may easily call to mind the contemporary example of Ronald Dworkin’s 
paradigmatic philosopher-judge in Hercules.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1978). 
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conservative.  Concurrently, they would also seem to treat discourse as a 
means to reaffirm what they perceive as those values antecedent to deliberation 
that define their respective liberal or conservative community’s norms.  As a 
practical matter, then, the philosophical insistence on sincerity in public 
discourse seems problematic for democracy, for instead of generating more 
political options through argument and debate in critical interaction, it tends to 
reaffirm that which the respective parties already know and publicly profess.95 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While it is natural to associate sincerity with truth, it is perhaps insincerity 
that may contribute more to the crucial work of free speech by which we may 
arrive at provisional political truths.  In particular, critical interaction benefits 
from ignoring the motives of the speakers and paying attention instead to the 
arguments’ merits.  Such indifference to insincerity helps to generate more 
choices for the audience. 
 
 95. The sort of self-enclosed exchange of psychological truths tends to be duplicated in the 
cultural mediums of academic magazines and journals, perhaps leading to the uncomfortable 
feeling that “conservatives write on conservatism for conservative readers, liberals on liberalism 
for liberals, Marxists on Marxism for Marxists, and so on.”  HERZOG, supra note 58, at ix. 
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